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The emergence of ecosystem-based fisheries management (EBFM)
has broadened the policy scope of fisheries management by
accounting for the biological and ecological connectivity of fish-
eries. Less attention, however, has been given to the economic
connectivity of fisheries. If fishers consider multiple fisheries
when deciding where, when, and how much to fish, then man-
agement changes in one fishery can generate spillover impacts in
other fisheries. Catch-share programs are a popular fisheries man-
agement framework that may be particularly prone to generating
spillovers given that they typically change fishers’ incentives and
their subsequent actions. We use data from Alaska fisheries to
examine spillovers from each of the main catch-share programs
in Alaska. We evaluate changes in participation—a traditional
indicator in fisheries economics—in both the catch-share and non–
catch-share fisheries. Using network analysis, we also investigate
whether catch-share programs change the economic connectivity
of fisheries, which can have implications for the socioeconomic
resilience and robustness of the ecosystem, and empirically iden-
tify the set of fisheries impacted by each Alaska catch-share
program. We find that cross-fishery participation spillovers and
changes in economic connectivity coincide with some, but not
all, catch-share programs. Our findings suggest that economic
connectivity and the potential for cross-fishery spillovers deserve
serious consideration, especially when designing and evaluating
EBFM policies.
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Ecosystem-based fisheries management (EBFM) has revolu-tionized the way we think about and manage ocean resources
(1). A key characteristic of EBFM is broadening the scope of
policy evaluation and design beyond the typical single-fishery
focus—a need that has been recognized and for which meth-
ods and models have been advanced on the ecological side (2).
However, just as fisheries within an ecosystem can be ecologi-
cally connected [e.g., through complex food-web interactions (3,
4)], they can also be economically connected if fishers participate
in multiple fisheries (5–7).
If fishers consider more than one fishery when deciding where,
when, and how much to fish, there is potential for economic and,
in turn, ecological outcomes in multiple fisheries to be jointly
determined. More generally, mismatches between the scope of
fisheries policy and the scope of policy impacts have led to calls
for integrated social–ecological system models that account for
system linkages between the resource units and between the
resource and socioeconomic characteristics (8). Despite these
calls, little work has been done to integrate socioeconomic moti-
vations and outcomes and operationalize models that include
socioeconomic factors into EBFM frameworks (9).
Economic connectivity of fisheries is particularly relevant if
fishers react to a policy change in one fishery (henceforth, the
target fishery) by changing their effort allocation in other fish-
eries. In this context, “leakage” or “spillover” of policy impacts
into nontarget fisheries is said to occur. Fishers may adjust effort
along the extensive margin—e.g., which fisheries to participate
in, if any—and/or the intensive margin—e.g., how much effort
to allocate to each of the fisheries they participate in (Fig. 1).
Leakage has the potential to generate both negative and posi-
tive impacts. For example, negative impacts can include a loss
in economic efficiency and increased pressure on species in fish-
eries that effort moves into (7, 10). However, leakage can also
generate positive impacts as it can be a means through which
fishers maintain a diverse portfolio of fishing effort, which has
been shown to help fishers and fishing communities mitigate risk
and smooth incomes (11–14).
Understanding and evaluating leakage across economically
connected fisheries is essential to accurately estimate the full
impact of a policy change in a manner consistent with best-
practice impact evaluation (15). Specifically, failing to account
for leakage can result in inaccurate predictions of postmanage-
ment changes (5), evaluations that do not capture changes in all
impacted entities, and biased estimates of impact in the target
fishery if other fisheries are used as controls (16). Nevertheless,
most economic modeling and evaluation of fisheries policy are
single-fishery focused.
Several recent studies have investigated cross-fishery spillovers
from a theoretical (17) and/or empirical (6, 7, 10, 18–21) perspec-
tive; however, these studies investigate leakage using a limited,
predetermined set of fisheries in which leakage can occur. In
practice, fisheries compose a complex and connected system, and
the scope of leakage is not immediately clear. To our knowledge,
the scope of leakage from a single-fishery policy has yet to be
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Fig. 1. Typology of responses to management change. Vessels exiting or
remaining in the target fishery after the policy change may adjust their
participation in other fisheries (direct impacts). These actions can lead to
a subsequent chain of spillover, or indirect, impacts in nontarget fisheries
and/or the network at large. Outcomes consistent with single-node pol-
icy design and evaluation are shown in black; outcomes consistent with
spillover are shown in dark teal.
empirically estimated. Further, no studies to date have explored
the extent to which a change in one fishery has changed the
economic connectivity of other fisheries, which can have impli-
cations for the socioeconomic resilience and robustness of the
ecosystem (22, 23).
Although there are many types of policy changes that could
generate spillover, we examine spillovers following the imple-
mentation of catch-share programs—which allocate individual
shares of a species’ total allowable catch to fishers—to under-
stand whether a single-fishery policy analysis is too narrow to
capture the full scope of policy impacts. We explore spillovers in
response to catch shares for three primary reasons. First, catch-
share programs are increasingly used worldwide and therefore an
important policy to explore from a management perspective (24).
Second, catch shares are typically implemented and evaluated on
a single-fishery basis—in direct contrast to EBFM’s ecosystem
scale. Finally, many catch-share programs have an objective to
address excess participation (or overcapacity) in the catch-share
fishery (25, 26), which raises the question, Where does the excess
participation go?
Several studies have examined the margins of change asso-
ciated with catch shares (27–31), including the effects of limits
on quota transferability within catch-share programs, which are
often implemented to meet social objectives (32); however, with
few exceptions (7, 21), these studies focus only on the fishery (or
fisheries) in which catch shares were implemented and generally
do not consider the potential implications of leakage. In con-
trast, we estimate the scope of leakage (i.e., the set of impacted
fisheries), changes in participation beyond the catch-share fish-
ery, and changes in economic connectivity that coincide with
catch-share implementation. To explore changes in economic
connectivity between fisheries we use network analysis, which
has been used in a variety of fisheries-related applications to
understand system connectivity and complexity (22, 33–35).
We evaluate leakage coinciding with the six major Alaska
catch-share programs (totaling 46–67% of annual catch volume),
using commercial fishing landings data for all catcher vessels
(about 6,000–8,000/y) that participated in 104 Alaska fisheries
between 1991 and 2015 (see SI Appendix for more details). The
catch-share programs vary in terms of their objectives, program
design (e.g., transferability of quota and limits on harvest activ-
ities in other fisheries), and fishery characteristics (26, 36). A
subset of vessels is active in multiple fisheries each year, the total
generally decreasing over time from 4,063 in 1991 to 1,350 in
2015. Vessels also exit and enter new fisheries each year, the total
generally decreasing over time and ranging from 173 to 869. We
identify significant changes in non–catch-share fishery participa-
tion and network connectivity that coincide with some, but not
all, catch-share programs, suggesting that economic connectivity
and the potential for leakage deserve serious consideration when
designing and evaluating EBFM policies.
Measuring Economic Connectivity and Leakage
We use networks to represent the aggregate behavior of indi-
vidual fishers and the economic connectivity of the Alaska
fishery system. We measure both fishery-level outcomes and—
analogous to the literature on ecological connections between
species in the EBFM literature (4)—the economic connectivity
of the entire fishery system. We generate two types of networks
for each year in our sample: (i) a network of cross-fishery par-
ticipation and (ii) a network of year-to-year migration of fishing
effort between fisheries (SI Appendix, Figs. S4–S7). In each net-
work, nodes represent fisheries. Each edge in the participation
network represents the number of vessels active in each of the
two connected fisheries. Each edge in the migration network rep-
resents the number of vessels exiting the edge-origin node and
entering the edge-destination node.
To measure leakage associated with catch-share programs, it is
necessary to link fisher actions to changes in network attributes.
Fishers can take several actions in response to a policy change,
which may or may not be consistent with a single-fishery pol-
icy scope. The suite of actions related to participation, entry,
and exit (Fig. 1 and Table 1) is applicable to both fishers in the
target fishery and fishers in the nontarget fisheries that experi-
ence leakage directly from the target fishery, thereby creating a
potential chain reaction of indirect leakage throughout the
Table 1. Fisher actions, network attributes, and network metrics
Cross-fishery
Actions Participation
participation (iii): Migration (iv):
Target Other Target (i) Nontarget (ii) weighted degree/ weighted out-
fishery fisheries node size node size centrality degree/centrality Leakage?
Exit N/A — 0 0 0 No
Exit Exit — — — 0 Yes
Exit Enter — + —/+ + Yes
Exit No change — 0 — 0 Yes
Remain Exit 0 — — 0 Yes
Remain Enter 0 + + 0 Yes
Remain No change 0 0 0 0 No
Symbols are used to represent whether, all else being equal, a change in the network metric will occur given
the fisher action (“0” is used to represent no change) and, if a change will occur, whether the metric will
increase (+) or decrease (−). N/A refers to the case where a fisher participates only in the target fishery before
the policy change and makes no adjustments that involve other fisheries postpolicy change.
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Fig. 2. Policy impacts on networks. (A–C) Three ways in which leakage from
a single-fishery policy (in fishery G) may manifest on networks.
network. We focus on four types of network attributes that can
experience change (Fig. 2): (i) participation in the target fishery
(Fig. 2A), (ii) participation in the nontarget fisheries (Fig. 2A),
(iii) cross-fishery participation (Fig. 2B), and (iv) migration of
participants between fisheries (Fig. 2C). All else being equal,
fisher actions that result in network changes of type i but not
types ii−iv do not change nontarget fishery participation or the
economic connectivity between fisheries and are therefore con-
sistent with a single-fishery policy scope. Not all changes may
take place, however, and only one of these changes (ii−iv) is
required for leakage to occur.
Network attributes can be measured via network metrics,
which we also link to fisher actions (Table 1). Node-level met-
rics characterize a fishery’s direct and indirect connectivity to
other fisheries in the network. Weighted degree is a measure
of a node’s strength or direct connectivity to other fisheries
and is calculated as the sum of all edge weights connected to
a node. In the cross-fishery participation network, a fishery’s
weighted degree measures the extent to which fishers also par-
ticipate in other fisheries. In the migration network, a fishery’s
weighted degree (hereafter called weighted out-degree for clar-
ity) measures the extent that fishers exit and enter other fisheries.
Weighted degree and out-degree can change with catch shares
reflecting a change in direct connectivity, through cross-fishery
participation or migration of participants, of the catch-share fish-
ery to other fisheries. Weighted closeness centrality is a measure
of a node’s strength and position in the network and is based on
a fishery’s average distance—i.e., the shortest path—to all other
fisheries. Closeness centrality measures the extent to which a
fishery is both directly and indirectly connected to other fisheries.
In the participation network, a fishery with high centrality is rela-
tively important to the ability of fishers to distribute effort across
fisheries (22). In the migration network, out-centrality identifies
fisheries that play an important role in facilitating the flow of exit
and entry across fisheries (in Fig. 2, G has a high out-centrality
and is the origin of much of the entry and exit observed in the
network). An increase in a fishery’s centrality with the onset of a
catch-share program indicates that catch shares have heightened
a fishery’s role in the cross-fishery participation and/or migration
patterns of fishers.
Results
We test for structural breaks that coincide with catch-share
implementation in the participation and economic connectiv-
ity (weighted degree, weighted out-degree, weighted centrality,
and weighted out-centrality) time series for the target fisheries
of the six major Alaska catch-share programs. Changes in both
the cross-fishery participation and migration networks coinciding
with some catch shares are also visually evident (Fig. 3).
We find evidence of a decrease in catch-share fishery partici-
pation, with four of the six fisheries exhibiting a significant reduc-
tion in the rate of change in participation following program
implementation, ranging from 37 percentage points (halibut) to
99 [Bristol Bay king crab (BBKC)] percentage points (Table 2).
While the reduction in the American Fisheries Act (AFA) pol-
lock fishery is statistically significant, the estimated effect is small
compared with estimated placebo effects generated by reassign-
ing the catch-share implementation year, suggesting that the
estimated effect may not stem from catch-share implementa-
tion. The rockfish fishery is the lone fishery that experienced an
increase in participation with catch shares, although the change
is small in absolute terms.
Under the null hypothesis that catch shares generate only
changes consistent with a single-fishery policy scope, implemen-

















Fig. 3. (A–D) Changes in cross-fishery participation
(A and B) and migration (C and D) networks: hal-
ibut/sablefish (1994–1995, A and C) and Bristol Bay
king crab (2004–2005, B and D) catch-share pro-
grams. For both networks, yellow shading represents
the scope of leakage and catch-share fisheries are
circled in orange. Networks for the remaining catch
shares are in SI Appendix. In the cross-participation
network (A and B), node size represents the change
in number of active vessels in the fishery between
the 2 y (red, loss; green, gain; blue, no change); edge
thickness corresponds to the change in the number
of active vessels participating in each of the con-
nected fisheries. In the net migration network (C and
D), node size represents the number of active vessels
in the fisheries the year before catch-share imple-
mentation. Edge thickness (or weight) corresponds
to the net number of vessels migrating from one
fishery to another. The arrows are drawn to repre-
sent vessels exiting the fishery at the arrow origin
and becoming active in the fishery at the arrow des-
tination. When no arrows are visible, the flow is
clockwise from origin to destination.































Table 2. Structural break test results for catch-share fisheries
Catch-share fishery, year implemented
Halibut Sablefish AFA BB king BS snow Rockfish
IFQ, IFQ, pollock, crab IFQ, crab IFQ, coops,
Network Network metric 1995 1995 2000† 2005 2006 2007
Node size −0.37*** −0.38*** −0.10*** −0.99*** −0.65*** 0.11***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.17) (0.00) (0.00) (0.16)
Cross-fishery Weighted −0.34*** −0.35*** −0.33*** −1.03*** −0.12* 0.060
degree (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.58) (0.53)
Cross-fishery Weighted 0.031 0.027 0.21*** −0.17*** −0.19*** 0.13*
centrality (0.71) (0.71) (0.13) (0.32) (0.25) (0.26)
Migration Weighted out- 1.06*** 0.84*** 0.040 1.42*** 1.09*** −2.44***
degree (0.00) (0.00) (0.88) (0.16) (0.08) (0.11)
Migration Weighted out- 0.67*** 0.53*** 0.27 0.69 0.30*** −0.55**
centrality (0.00) (0.00) (0.54) (0.58) (0.33) (0.53)
P values from placebo tests are in parentheses.
*P< 0.10; **P< 0.05; ***P< 0.01. BB, Bristol Bay; BS, Bering Sea; IFQ, individual fishing quota.
†The program implementation date was 1999, but applied to catcher vessels in 2000.
connectivity measures. Thus, rejecting the null hypothesis of no
structural break for any of these metrics implies that leakage
coincides with catch-share programs. Time series from the cross-
fishery participation network suggest that catch-share implemen-
tation did result in leakage: The null hypothesis of no structural
break in weighted degree is consistently rejected for three of the
fisheries that experienced a reduction in participation (Table 2).
Decreases in weighted degree indicate that the primary source of
leakage is from fishers leaving the target and/or other fisheries, as
opposed to remaining in the target fishery and joining new fish-
eries. While the reduction in weighted degree for the Bering Sea
snow crab (BSSC) fishery is statistically significant, the estimated
effect is small compared with the estimated placebo effects, sug-
gesting that the estimated effect may not stem from the catch
share. It is worth noting, however, that the BSSC fishery expe-
rienced a large decrease in weighted degree the year before
catch-share implementation, which is likely due to (i) catch
shares being implemented in the BBKC fishery the year before,
which coincided with a large decrease in BBKC participation,
and (ii) many of the fishers that exited the BBKC fishery also
having participated in the BSSC fishery. Although changes in
direct connectivity of some fisheries are evidenced by changes in
weighted degree, placebo tests suggest that the relative position-
ing of the catch-share fisheries, as measured by centrality, does
not experience significant change.
The existence of leakage is further supported by the migra-
tion network (Table 2). Three of the six catch-share fisheries
exhibit a significant increase in weighted out-degree after catch-
share implementation, ranging from 84% (sablefish) to 109%
(BSSC), suggesting that catch shares induced fishers to exit the
target fisheries and enter new fisheries. There is also evidence
of changes in migration patterns, specifically the position of the
catch-share fishery in the network of migration, as measured
by the weighted out-centrality. The sign and significance of the
out-centrality coefficients suggest that the halibut and sablefish
fisheries exhibit increasing centrality, reflecting an increasing
role facilitating the flow of exit and entry across fisheries after
catch-share implementation.
To estimate the scope of leakage and further investigate
changes in participation and economic connectivity throughout
the network, we use a cluster-detection algorithm (37) to statis-
tically partition the network into clusters of fisheries that exhibit
high levels of connectivity within the cluster, but relatively low
connectivity outside it. We identify separate clusters for each net-
work and for each catch-share year. The cluster of fisheries that
contains the catch-share fishery represents the scope of leakage
(Fig. 3). The halibut and sablefish catch-share fisheries are con-
tained in the same cluster and have the largest scope of leakage
relative to the other catch-share programs—34 or 67 fisheries,
depending on the network. Moreover, both the halibut and sable-
fish fisheries are central to the cluster, suggesting that these two
fisheries are the origin of the network change (38). The BBKC
and BSSC fisheries have smaller scopes of leakage (ranging from
13 to 19 fisheries) and are also central to their own respective
clusters. The AFA pollock and rockfish fisheries are in rela-
tively small clusters (the rockfish fishery was the only fishery in
its cluster for the migration network) and neither one is cen-
tral to its own cluster, suggesting that changes in the cluster
should not be attributed to catch-share implementation in these
fisheries.
To estimate the scale of leakage that occurred in the clus-
ter, we test for a structural break in the network metrics for
the fisheries contained in the cluster (Table 3). Coinciding with
the drop in participation in the halibut, sablefish, and BBKC
fisheries, we observe a significant increase in total participa-
tion in other fisheries within their respective clusters. There
is less evidence of a change in connectivity of other fisheries
in the cluster in the cross-fishery participation network, with
the exception of a decrease in connectivity of fisheries within
the BBSC catch-share program cluster. Several catch-share pro-
grams significantly influenced the scale of migration of vessels
throughout the clusters: On average, weighted out-degree in
other fisheries increased by 50% and 59% with catch-share
implementation in the BBKC and halibut/sablefish clusters,
respectively. Moreover, significant increases in out-centrality
corresponding to the halibut/sablefish and BBSC catch-share
programs indicate an increase in migration throughout the
network.
Discussion
We demonstrate that fishery policies have the potential to have
spillover impacts beyond the target fishery; thus, the economic
connectivity of fisheries is important to consider when designing
and evaluating fishery management policy. Moreover, spillover
impacts are likely to be heterogeneous, and therefore the eco-
nomic, ecological, and institutional specifics of the network must
be taken into consideration to avoid unintended consequences.
Indeed, our analysis of Alaska fisheries networks shows that
changes to economic connectivity and migration patterns coin-
cide with the implementation of some, but not all, catch-share
programs. Further, the scope of leakage and the degree to
which other fisheries exhibit changes in economic connectivity
differ across catch-share programs. The halibut and sablefish
catch-share programs exhibit the largest scope and scale of leak-
age, followed by the BBKC and BSSC fisheries; in contrast,
the AFA pollock and rockfish catch-share programs did not



















Table 3. Structural break test results for catch-share cluster fisheries
Catch-share fishery
Halibut/ AFA BB king BS snow Rockfish
Network Network metric sablefish IFQ pollock crab IFQ crab IFQ coops
Migration Cluster 0.080*** 0.023 0.12*** −0.09*** —
participation (0.04) (0.71) (0.06) (0.21)
Cross-fishery Weighted −0.22** 0.19 0.12 −0.42* −0.31
degree (0.21) (0.42) (0.32) (0.12) (0.16)
Cross-fishery Weighted −0.10** 0.26** 0.01 −0.31*** −0.00
centrality (0.46) (0.13) (0.90) (0.04) (0.84)
Migration Weighted out- 0.59*** −0.10 0.50** 0.44 —
degree (0.04) (0.67) (0.05) (0.29)
Migration Weighted out- 0.29*** 0.082 −0.25 0.43*** —
centrality (0.04) (0.54) (0.16) (0.04)
The rockfish fishery is the only fishery in the migration network cluster, and therefore no hypothesis testing
is conducted. P values from placebo tests are in parentheses. *P< 0.10; **P< 0.05; ***P< 0.01. IFQ, individual
fishing quota.
generate much (if any) leakage. Moreover, estimates for the
rockfish program also tended to be opposite to those for other
fisheries.
There are several potential explanations for the heteroge-
neous effects across catch-share programs, as leakage from a
single-fishery policy will generally depend on socioeconomic,
biological, and institutional factors. For instance, the degree to
which fishers are able and willing to substitute between fish-
eries in response to a policy shock could depend on the type of
gear used, the fishing area, and the species harvested in other
fisheries. Previous work has shown that fishers in Alaska are
more likely to jointly permit in fisheries that share the same
area and gear (35); thus, policies implemented in fisheries that
do not share gear type and fishing areas with many other fish-
eries are not likely to generate much leakage. This is true of
the rockfish and AFA pollock fisheries, both of which harvest
with trawl gear in the Bering Sea and Western/Central Gulf
of Alaska, respectively, where there are relatively few other
fisheries that use the same gear. In contrast, the halibut and
sablefish fisheries use long-line gear and are primarily prose-
cuted in the Central/Eastern Gulf of Alaska, where there are
several other fisheries that share the same gear. Indeed, the
halibut and sablefish fisheries were relatively more connected
to other fisheries than the AFA pollock and rockfish fisheries
before catch-share implementation, suggesting a preexisting dif-
ference in substitution possibilities between the two sets of
fisheries. Fishers’ ability to substitute between fisheries will also
depend on the nature of the catch-share program, as well as the
regulatory environment of other fisheries. For example, quota
transferability restrictions—which exist to varying degrees in
all Alaska catch-share programs—and/or limited entry regula-
tions in other fisheries may act as barriers that impede policy
spillovers from the target fishery. Similarly, sideboard limits—
which limit the ability of catch-share participants to participate
in other fisheries—also restrict catch-share leakage from occur-
ring. In fact, the four catch-share programs with the least amount
of leakage (i.e., BBKC, BSSC, AFA pollock, and rockfish) had
some form of sideboard limits introduced alongside catch shares,
suggesting that there was already some awareness in the man-
agement system of the potential challenges of spillovers. Finally,
the extent of leakage from a catch-share program will also
depend on the initial conditions of the catch-share fishery. For
example, overcapacity was relatively less of a concern in the
rockfish fishery, which may partially explain why estimates of
the scope and scale of leakage for the rockfish fishery were
either insignificant or opposite to those for the other catch-share
fisheries.
Our analysis of catch-share leakage exploits network theory
to understand policy impacts (39). However, further research
challenges must be overcome before spillover effects from past
and future single-fishery policies can be fully predicted and
management goals that may be influenced by spillover evalu-
ated. Chief among them is how to reconcile individual-, vessel-,
and community-level analyses and outcomes that show the ben-
efits and risks of fishery portfolio diversification (11–14, 31)
with the current scope of policymaking, which is typically the
fishery. A better understanding of other types of leakage is
also warranted, such as those related to social factors—e.g.,
employment and community well-being (40)—and distributional
impacts—e.g., small- vs. large-scale operators. One opportunity
is to explore linking these scales within EBFM frameworks.
This work also raises questions about the appropriate scale
for EBFM, specifically the possibility that there is a mismatch
between the scales of ecological and economic connectivity. Our
analysis includes all Alaska fisheries and is arguably one of the
larger analyses of fishing policy outcomes to date. Although
not investigated here, there is also evidence that spillover may
occur between fishing regions or countries and therefore an even
broader scope may be appropriate (21, 41).
Additionally, more work is needed to integrate economic
connectivity into models of socio-environmental systems more
broadly. Although we emphasize system change in response to
a particular policy (catch-share programs), the concepts and
methods developed could be extended to other policy changes
and also ecological changes, such as a rapid stock collapse or
slower disturbances (e.g., climate change). Furthermore, the eco-
nomic connectivity modeled here can be viewed as an analog
to work on ecological system structure and linkages empha-
sized under EBFM (4); future work could link the economic
and ecological networks (42), potentially also including other
social factors—such as information sharing and governance—
to develop integrated socio-environmental models suitable
for assessing the impact of policy and/or ecological system
shocks.
Materials and Methods
We use confidential Alaska region commercial fishing data collected by the
Alaska Department of Fish and Game. The dataset includes one record per
landing for all commercial fishing trips made by catcher vessels in the Alaska
region, about 500,000 records per year, from 1991 to 2015. The landings
database is comprehensive for catcher vessels, but not for catcher processors
that process their catch at sea; thus we focus only on catch-share pro-
grams that were implemented in fisheries with catcher vessels and remove
all catcher processor records from the analysis. Each record in the landings
database includes a vessel identifier and the permitted fishery in which har-
vesting took place. In total, there are 104 fisheries, defined as a unique
area/species/gear combination (SI Appendix).
We test for a structural break in the time series of participation and
the network metrics (node size, weighted degree, weighted out-degree,































weighted centrality, and weighted out-centrality), thereby controlling for
background trends stemming from changes in biological, economic, and
other processes. We estimate a time-series regression model for a given
fishery as
ln(Vt)− ln(Vt−1) = β0 + β1Dt + β2t + β3t2 + et , [1]
where V denotes the network statistic, Dt denotes an indicator variable
equal to one for the year immediately after catch-share implementation and
zero otherwise, t represents year, and et represents an idiosyncratic error.
Testing for a structural break immediately after catch shares were intro-
duced is equivalent to testing the null hypothesis of β1 = 0. Note that this
specification looks for a structural break in the flow of, or first difference in,
the time series. Since the migration network is already the first difference
in networks, metrics from the migration network are not first differenced
when estimating Eq. 1. Standard errors are computed using the Newey–West
variance estimator (43). We also compare our estimates of β1 to a reference
distribution of placebo effects, which are generated by iteratively reassign-
ing the catch-share intervention year and reestimating Eq. 1. If the original
estimate of β1 is small relative to the distribution of placebo effects, then
we have less confidence that the effect is from catch-share implementation
(44, 45). We also consider lagged impacts that take place in the first few
years following catch-share implementation (see SI Appendix for additional
details).
To estimate the scope of leakage, we apply a cluster-detection algo-
rithm to the net-migration network and to year-to-year changes in the
cross-participation network. We assign fisheries to clusters for each of the
catch-share programs for the year in which the program was introduced
to maximize modularity, which measures the extent to which clusters, or
densely connected groups of nodes with only sparse connections between
groups, exist in the network (46).
Within each cluster, we test whether participation and network metrics
exhibit a structural break at the time of catch-share implementation for the
fisheries contained in the cluster to estimate the scale of leakage. To esti-
mate a change in cluster participation, we follow Eq. 1 but use the total
number of participants that were active in at least one fishery in the migra-
tion cluster beyond that/those the catch share was implemented in. To test
for changes in economic connectivity, we estimate a panel-regression model
for a given cluster that is identical to Eq. 1, except that we exploit the longi-
tudinal nature of the data and allow for fishery-specific fixed effects β0,i . To
explore whether cluster-level structural breaks can be attributed to catch-
share implementation, we identify the central node(s) within each cluster
based on closeness centrality. Centrality of nodes is recognized as a means
of identifying the optimal seeding nodes (38), and we use it to identify the
conceptual opposite—i.e., the origin of the network change. Therefore, to
the extent the catch-share fishery has the highest centrality, we attribute
the structural breaks within the cluster to the catch-share fishery.
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